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Abstract
Realising sustainable development is a major challenge for most African countries. Economic
growth in most African countries is largely centred on the extraction of natural resources,
particularly minerals. Rather than facilitate development, the extraction of natural resources
in most countries, has been a source of adverse outcomes. That is, natural resources led to
‘the resource curse’, partly because of bad governance and leadership. Through governance
and leadership, Botswana emerged differently. The country transformed itself to a middle
income status through the prudent utilization and management of mineral (non-renewable)
resources; making Botswana one of the few resource rich countries that have so far avoided
the blight of the ‘the resource curse’. Yet, the sole reliance on one non-renewable resource is
risky as evidenced by the recent global financial crisis. Sustainable development necessitates
greater emphasis on renewable resources whose utilization and management require a
different strategy to drive development forward. The paper identifies governance and
leadership amongst the central tenets to Botswana’s development success story. It argues that,
for the last four decades its governance and leadership strategy served the country well, given
the context of the time. Going forward, an enhanced governance and leadership strategy is
necessary to successfully exploit and manage the country’s resources for the benefit of all. In
conclusion, African states need to review the role of governance and leadership in order to
realize sustainable development.
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Introduction
Governance is acknowledged internationally by policy makers, aid agencies and institutions,
including the World Bank, as a major policy imperative to facilitate sustainable development
– albeit contested. Utilizing Hyden, Court and Mease’s (2004) conceptualization of
governance, and as built on by Robert Rotberg (2005), this paper seeks to demonstrate that,
undeniably governance is critical to the success of any country’s development prospects.
Hyden, Court and Mease (2004,16) defined governance as “the formation and stewardship of
the formal and, informal rules that regulate the public realm, the area in which state as well as
economic and societal actors interact to make decisions”. For Rotberg (2004, 71), governance
entails “the tension-filled interaction between citizens and their rulers and the various means
by which governments can either help or hinder their constituents’ ability to achieve
satisfaction and material prosperity”. When governance is measured in terms of the quality of
delivery of goods, both in quality and quantity, as Rotberg (2004) asserts, the majority of
African countries are far and/or struggling to realize this goal.
The concept of governance and its effect on policy discourse has been evolving since the
market liberalization reforms of the 1980s (Kwame Sundaram and Chowdhury, 2012).
However, it was not until in the 1990s that it was embraced as a major international policy
consideration (Sebudubudu, 2010; Kwame Sundaram and Chowdhury, 2012). In turn,
governance has become a critical theme for several conferences internationally in an attempt
to encourage and nurture it. Consequently, the World Bank introduced its Worldwide
Governance Indicators (WGIs) research project that entails six elements of; voice and
accountability,

political

stability

and

absence

of

violence/terrorism,

government

effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay
and Mastruzzi 2009:2). However, research; even from within the Bank itself, have criticized
WGIs for their conceptual and methodological flaws (Kwame Sundaram and Chowdhury,
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2012). Despite its flaws, governance has become a standard requirement to qualify for donor
assistance or loans and/or grants from financial institutions. Even then Rotberg (2004,72)
warns us that “tying donor assistance to good governance conditionality may help at the
margin”.
The effects of bad governance are more evident in Africa – where life is depressing and
unbearable for the majority of people. Understandably, the absence of good governance
retards economic development and delivery of goods to the majority of people. Deplorably,
most African countries have failed to realise development despite an abundance of resources,
because of mainly bad governance. This shows that resource endowment does not
automatically translate into development. Take for instance a number of African countries
such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Nigeria. The Economist
considers Angola “one of sub-Saharan Africa's richest countries”. Not only is it regarded as
the fifth producer of diamonds in the world but “its oil wells … produce 1.9m barrels a day;
on present trends, it could overtake Nigeria to become Africa's largest producer. It [also] has
huge agricultural potential” (2011, http://www.economist.com; accessed 16 June 2014).
Despite its wealth, “Only 9% of Luanda's population of 5m has running water, a lower share
than during the civil war. Across Angola, half the population of 18m has virtually no access
to health care. The country has one of the world's highest rates of infant mortality, and the
only known cases of urban polio” (2011, http://www.economist.com; accessed 16 June
2014). Nigeria is another country that is equally rich in Africa yet its poverty levels remain
alarmingly high. Despite being one of the major producers of oil in Africa, and in the world,
the number of people living in poverty in Nigeria was put at 112.47 million in 2010, up from
17.1 million in 1980 (BBC news Africa, 2012; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa17015873; accessed 16th June 2014). The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is
similarly rich in natural resources yet the country “hardly [has] any roads or railways, while
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the health and education systems lie in ruins”, which is a clear indication that “its resource
wealth has rarely been harnessed for [its people’s] benefit” (BBC news Africa, 2012;
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11108589, accessed 16 June 2014). There are many
such countries in Africa, which are rich in natural resources, yet poor largely because of bad
governance. However, one thing is certain about the three African countries cited above. The
level of deprivation has nothing to do with shortage of economic resources to drive
development, suggesting that resource endowment has been a curse in those countries. These
are clear examples of African countries that have been poorly governed. Nevertheless, there
are countries in Africa that emerged differently, and Botswana is one such a country, which is
the focus of this paper. The paper, first uses the case of Botswana to show how governance of
land and natural resources assisted it to evade the resource curse - suggesting that indeed
governance makes a difference to a country’s development prospects. Second, it seeks to
show how the country can use renewable resources (agriculture and tourism) to achieve
sustainable development. As shown with the mineral sector, we contend that governance is
even critical for renewable resources to realize their full potential in terms of their
contribution to sustainable development. It is the case of Botswana that we now turn to.

Governance of Land and Natural Resources for Sustainable Development: The
Botswana Context
The story of Botswana’s democratic developmental achievements seems like a fairy tale - but
this is real. To some, it is like a puzzle that analysts have been trying to understand and
explain over the years. Yet, no single satisfactory explanation has been offered for how and
why the country transformed itself the way it did in the last 48 years of self-rule. At
independence, Botswana was considered as a hopeless case that had “dismal economic
prospects … based on vague hopes of agriculture, salt and coal” (Beattie 2009, 115 quoting a
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British Government Report on Botswana’s future in 1960). Both social and economic
indicators pointed in that direction, and these have been well documented in the literature.
For instance, the literacy rate stood at 25%, per capita income was around U$ 80 while life
expectancy was put at 48 (Sebudubudu and Molutsi, 2011). There was virtually no physical
infrastructure as well. Masire (2006) notes that there were ‘only eight kilometres’ of tarred
road, and Beattie (2009) at the most put them at ‘12 kilometres’. Faced with all these, the
country had to make the critical decisions at the material time. As Masire (2006, 168)
observed,
it was clear from the very beginning that if we were to succeed in raising the living
standard of our people, we would have to find the greatest amount of financial
resources possible, invest them to achieve a high rate of economic growth, and create
productive employment opportunities.
Indeed, Botswana’s leaders lived to their pledges by making the critical decisions and
ensuring that the country was not misgoverned. 48 years later, the Botswana’s story is
different. While most African countries went on a path of bad governance and selfdestruction (i.e Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra
Leone and many others), Botswana is one of a few countries that “through fiscal discipline
and sound management” used its resources, particularly its diamond wealth, to leap “from
being one of the poorest in the world to a middle-income country with a per capita GDP of
$16, 400 in 2013”, and sustained “one of the world’s highest economic growth rates since
independence in 1966” (The World Factbook, 2014; https://www.cia.gov; accessed 23 June
2013).
As can be seen from Figure 1 below, as growth performance improved poverty also declined
from 46.1% in 1985/86 poverty dropped to about 20% (Statistics Botswana, 2011), in part
due to the prudent use of mineral revenues.
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Figure 1: Real GDP Growth and Poverty rate

Source: Bank of Botswana Annual Report (2013) and Statistics Botswana (2011)

At the same time the country is grappling with challenges of inequality, poverty and
unemployment. This is largely because the mineral sector is not inclusive although it is a
major contributor to the GDP growth.
As Sebudubudu and Molutsi (2011,10) aptly pointed out , “assessing Botswana on the basis
of the core indicators of health (reduced mortality), education (basic literacy rate) and
economic performance (increased per capita income), good leadership has enabled the
country to record impressive achievements”. Moreover, the country “also used its mineral
wealth to improve infrastructure so that there now exists some 10 000 km of paved road…”
(Sebudubudu and Molutsi 2011,10).
International indicators also suggest that Botswana has been successful in a number of
measures. For instance, the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) project
percentile rankings for Botswana in the period 1996 – 2012 (as shown in Table 1 below)
indicate that the country has consistently performed well in the six governance dimensions
of; voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality,
rule of law and control of corruption. Save for voice and accountability that has experienced a
decline between 2005 and 2011, the country has maintained stable and high percentile
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rankings in the other five dimensions – suggesting good performance on the quality of its
governance.
Table 1: Botswana Governance ranking: 1996-2012
Year
1996
1998
2000
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Voice &
accountability
74.52
70.19
66.83
67.79
68.27
72.6
65.87
61.54
61.06
61.54
59.24
61.14
59.62
64

Political
stability
77
77
79
73
86
77
84
80
82
81
83
82
83
89

Government
Effectiveness
68
71
71
73
75
73
72
70
73
70
68
67
67
67

Regulatory
Quality
75
74
72
75
75
72
70
66
65
65
66
67
69
74

Rule of
law
63
68.42
64.59
64.59
71.29
69.86
67.46
67.46
67.94
70.19
68.25
68.72
69.95
70

Control of
Corruption
75
78
75
75
86
80
83
78
79
80
79
80
80
79

Source: Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A and Mastruzzi, M, 2013 Update World Governance indicators

Other surveys equally suggest that Botswana is performing well. The country has been rated
the least corrupt country in Africa for 18 years by Transparency International Corruption
Perception Index (CPI). The 2013 CPI placed Botswana at position 30 out of 177 countries.
In terms of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) that measures four governance
categories of - safety & rule of law, participation & human rights, sustainable economic
opportunity, and human development - Botswana was also ranked 3rd and 2nd in Africa in
2012 and 2013 respectively.
To this extent, the country’s indicators reflect a marked improvement, unparalleled to many
countries in Africa. It is in this context that Hope (1998, 539) when noting the transformation
the country had realised aptly quipped that “in whichever way measured, or determined,
Botswana is one of Africa’s star performers. [Undoubtedly, the country] is exceptional, both
within Africa and among less developed countries, as a whole, when comparison is made of
7

macro-economic performance, development management, and good governance”. This paper
locates Botswana’s accomplishments in its governance architecture. At the centre of
Botswana’s success is its governance of land and natural resources, particularly its mineral
policy. It is its land management and mineral policies in Botswana that we now turn to.

Governance of Land and Minerals in Botswana
Botswana’s success is largely anchored on its governance and usage of natural resources –
land and minerals. At independence, land and minerals were identified as ‘strategic
resources’ whose ‘ownership and control’ was critical to the country’s development
prospects. Regarding land, a deliberate effort was made to transfer its ownership mainly from
the different tribes and chiefs, and individual owners to the state (Mazonde, 1987; Adams,
Kalabamu and White, 2003; Sebudubudu and Molutsi 2011). As a result, two major policies
were introduced - the Tribal Land Act of 1968 and the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) of
1975 that “succeeded in taking/reducing the chief’s control of tribal land and establishing
individual control of large ranches of tribal land” (Sebudubudu and Molutsi 2011, 24). The
Tribal Land Act established “the land board as the custodian of tribal land allocation,
administration and recipient of any revenue from such land by its private users” (Sebudubudu
and Molutsi 2011, 24), marking a departure from the chiefs land allocation era. And as
Masire (2006, 184) puts it, this was “part of our effort to remove the arbitrary power of the
chiefs, we needed to create a new system for allocation of land”. However, some scholars
(Baland et al, 1996; Poteete, 1999 and Makepe, 2006) have argued that the transference of
land allocation from the chiefs may have led to the deligitimisation of traditional institutions
for land management and impacted negatively on communal range land management. With
regard to the TGLP, it was flawed because it allowed ranch owners with large herd sizes to
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graze their cattle within and without ranches increasing grazing pressure on the remaining
communal land
At independence, ownership of the three types of land was put at 48.8% tribal land (formerly
tribal reserves), 47.4% state land (formerly crown land) and 3.7% freehold land (Adams,
Kalabamu and White, 2003). Although the country held on to its three types of land, “the
government has since independence adopted a policy not to increase freehold tenure. Tribal
land has progressively increased from 49% to 71%, through conversion of state and freehold
land” (Mothibi, Malatsi and Finnström, n. d). Consequently, ownership of land rights is put at
71% tribal land, 25% state land and 4% freehold land (Adams, Kalabamu and White, 2003;
Mothibi, Malatsi and Finnström, n. d). The effect of this policy is that, in the main, it
centralised land rights as a resource under the control of the state. It is in this context that
Adams, Kalabamu and White (2003,1) observed that Botswana “has developed a robust land
administration, which has greatly contributed to good governance and economic progress. Its
land tenure policy has been described as one of careful change, responding to particular needs
with specific tenure innovations”. To this extent they noted that “its approach is of interest
because it is finding solutions to problems that continue to elude its neighbours”.
A related policy was made with respect to ownership of mineral rights by the state through
the Mines and Minerals Act of 1967. As Masire (2006, 200-201) noted “even before we
understood our potential mineral wealth, we knew that vesting minerals rights in the state
would be critical for both our overall economic development and our political unity and
stability”. This, he declares was “with full consultation of the people” (Masire 2006, 199).
The transfer of mineral rights from the different tribes to the state was possible in part
because the first minerals were found in an area controlled by the Bangwato tribe, Seretse
Khama’s tribe. To this extent, Seretse Khama was instrumental in ensuring that mineral rights
were entrusted on the state (Masire, 2006; Sebudubudu and Molutsi, 2011). This is supported
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by Sebudubudu and Molutsi (2011,27) who retorted that “the new elites that assumed office
at independence, particularly under the leadership of Seretse Khama, played a crucial role in
ensuring that mineral rights were ceded from the different ethnic groupings to the central
government, following an extended consultation process with the different ethnic groups.
This was made easy because the first minerals were discovered in the Bangwato area, the
birthplace of Seretse Khama”. This policy of entrusting minerals rights on the state has been
lauded and is often regarded to be at the heart of prudent mineral utilization in Botswana as it
ensured that minerals benefited the whole nation as opposed to sectional interests where the
minerals were found. To some extent Botswana was lucky because her diamonds are buried
underground requiring technical expertise and know how to extract them. This also made it
easy to control and manage them. In contrast, other countries such as Sierra Leone, diamonds
are readily found above the ground making them more difficult to control and manage.
In addition to this policy, the government entered “into a strategic partnership with
international capital. De Beers, in particular, became a critical partner forming a uniquely
successful coalition [called DEBSWANA] that mined and managed sales and shared
revenues in such a way that it has benefited the country’s development programme in a
sustainable way” (Sebudubudu and Molutsi 2011,27). This partnership was necessary
because at the time Botswana did not have the expertise to exploit the diamonds by herself.
She then accepted and entered into a partnership with De Beers with 15% (Botswana
government) and 85% (De Beers) which she later renegotiated to 50 -50 partnership for 25
years.
It is this unique partnership and indeed how the proceeds were used that came to define
modern Botswana, with minerals playing a central role in its development and
transformation, from being a poor to a middle income country. As time went on and the
country developed it was realised that the country was missing out on the potential that
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existed for vertical diversification or beneficiation of the diamond industry. Eventually when
the contract with De Beers was drawing to a close the country’s leaders and policy makers
saw the opportunity to renegotiate the contract with De Beers so that a new contract could be
signed that would facilitate the beneficiation of the diamond industry.
According to Mbayi, (2013, 25) Botswana’s real opportunity came in 2005 when DeBeers’
25 year mining license was due for renewal. The government had a lot of bargaining power
due to the significance of Debswana’s production in De Beers’ global production. In 2005,
Botswana accounted for about 60% of De Beers’ supply of rough diamonds (Even-Zohar,
2007:46). The government insisted that in order for De Beers to renew its mining license for
another 25 years it should help Botswana in creating a viable cutting and polishing industry.
De Beers gave in to the government's demands and signed the new mining contract under the
following conditions: (1) a renewal of the mining licences for Debswana for 25 years, (2) the
sale of Debswana’s production to the Diamond Trading Company (DTC) International for
another five years; and (3) the establishment of DTC Botswana (De Beers, 2007).
This is an excellent example of the good governance and strategic thinking of Botswana’s
leadership because the contract that was renegotiated and eventually signed resulted in the
formation of the Diamond Trading Company Botswana (DTCB). This company comprises
50% ownership by both parties. In addition, Botswana has 15% of De Beers with an option to
buy up to 25%. However, when the shares were up for sale Botswana opted not to increase
her shareholding in De Beers to 25% because she was risk averse coupled with the fact that
she would still remain a minority shareholder. The ingenuity of this arrangement is that it
further strengthens Botswana’s negotiation position in future talks with DeBeers.
As a direct result of the new contractual arrangement in 2013, Diamond Trading Company
International (DTCI) was successfully relocated to Gaborone from London and sells and
markets rough diamonds locally.

This has promoted local citizen participation and
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empowerment through employment creation and active participation in running of the
companies which buy these rough diamonds from the DTCB. About 21 companies have been
given licence by the government of Botswana to do the diamond cutting and polishing
activities locally. Beneficiation of diamonds in Botswana is also seen as a major transfer of
skills. The government has reported growth in the diamond cutting and polishing sector
creating 3651 jobs with 27 such companies licensed in 2013 (Republic of Botswana, 2013).
Diversifying the economy away from minerals is critical because the sole reliance on one
non-renewable resource is risky as evidenced during the recent global financial crisis. This
suggests that the country needs to review its strategy by investing in renewable resources for
it to realize sustainable development. Sustainable development necessitates greater emphasis
on renewable resources whose utilization and management require a different strategy to
drive development forward. It is the utilization and management of renewable resources in
Botswana that we turn to.

Governance of Renewable Resource Based Sectors for Economic Diversification
In this section of the paper, the focus is on renewable resources based sectors. With
diamonds, the country was able to reduce poverty levels to just below 20% (Statistics
Botswana, 2011). The drive towards economic diversification necessitates a search for a
strategy that can result in the successful harnessing of renewable resource based sectors for
the benefit of all.
The proper management of the utilization of renewable resources is critical for sustainable
development. Although these resources are renewable and can therefore regenerate
themselves, they possess unique characteristics1 which if ignored could lead to their overuse
1

For example, access to livestock on communal rangelands in Botswana is free and unrestricted (open access)
and if not properly managed can lead to overstocking, overgrazing and subsequently desertification.
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and eventual depletion. In the same vein, if such resources are underutilised opportunities for
development are missed. Such outcomes are detrimental to sustainability and the very
livelihoods of the people who are directly dependent on these resources for survival. It is
well known and widely accepted that the poor are directly dependent on renewable resources,
for their survival. In many cases they reside in rural areas where day to day life is directly
linked with the environment. Yet, with rural to urban migration this is increasingly becoming
true of urban areas. Therefore, the environment is inextricably linked to and underpins goals
to reduce poverty and promote economic growth and diversification.
Given the above, the challenge then becomes what in terms of governance can be transferred
from Botswana’s diamond success story to the renewable resource based sectors so that the
utilization of the country’s renewable resources can be successfully managed for the benefit
of all. The two renewable resource based sectors we focus on are agriculture and tourism
because of their importance to the Botswana economy. Figure 2 below, shows agriculture and
tourism’s contribution to GDP. During the global financial crisis of 2008/09, the risk of
Botswana’s reliance on mining was evident. Consequently, agriculture and tourism, as shown
in Figure 2 below, emerged as the main drivers of the economy during the crisis and possibly
beyond. These are the very sectors that we argue have a potential to assist in the
diversification and sustainable development of Botswana since they are labour intensive and
thus inclusive.
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Figure 2: Agriculture and Tourism Contribution to GDP
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Source: Bank0of Botswana Annual Report (2013)

Within agriculture we focus on the governance of the beef value chain and for tourism we
focus on Community Based Tourism (CBT) with a focus on Community Based Natural
Resource Management (CBNRM) programme. What has been achieved and what needs to be
done to improve the performance of the sectors in a way that is inclusive?
Agriculture: The Botswana Beef Value Chain
Botswana has a national cattle herd of about three million (CSO, 2006). About 80% of which
are held by people owning up to 20 cattle reared extensively on communal land, where access
to grazing is free and unrestricted (Makepe, 2006; Marumo et al, 2009). These small herders
are also the main sellers of cattle to the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC). Therefore, they
benefit the most from having the option to sell to the BMC, in addition to the other smaller
less lucrative outlets on the domestic market.
About half of the country’s population resides in the rural areas where they rely primarily on
agriculture for their livelihood (CSO, 2011). In fact, in 1966 traditional cattle farming was the
dominant and highest contributor to (Agriculture’s contribution to GDP) AgGDP, total
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exports and employment (Marumo et al, 2009). This suggests the beef value chain and its
proper governance are critical to Botswana. Further, the benefits from investing in agriculture
are felt in the long term compared to those from diamonds which are more immediate.
Investing is agriculture is a long, steady and painful process requiring patience, good and
strong leadership because the benefits from such investment are felt in the long term.
Consequently, good governance and strong leadership are vital to transform the beef value
chain and make it more competitive in lucrative export markets.
More than 80% of the beef produced is exported through the Botswana Meat Commission
(BMC) which has the sole monopoly on beef exports (Fidzani et al, 1997, Marumo et al,
2009). As one of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, Botswana has benefited
from access to the lucrative European Union (EU) market, with a quota of 18 916 tonnes;
first under the Lome Convention followed by the Cotonou agreement and lately under the
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU. The EU EPA however is drawing to a
close in October 2014. Notably, Botswana has not been able to meet its quota due to supply
bottlenecks (Makepe, 1996) and less than favourable governance of the complex beef value
chain (van Engelen et al, 2013). Failure to meet the quota represents a lost missed
opportunity in terms of revenue generation for cattle producers and the country as a whole.
In the last decade, world markets have shifted from being mass produce markets to
differentiated product markets and niche markets for consumers with higher purchasing
power. This has propelled a shift towards sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures to be
used as a strategic tool, rather than a protectionist measure, for developing and differentiating
markets, gaining market access, coordinating the quality and safety of the food system and
defining niche markets for affected products (Reardon et al, 2001). On the demand side, high
income consumers with varied and sophisticated tastes have buttressed this change and on the
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supply side so have production, processing and distribution technologies that allow for
product differentiation and market extension and segmentation (Reardon et al, 2001).
Consequently, SPS measures have now become a competitive instrument in differentiated
product markets (Reardon et al, 2001). More often than not, developing countries lament the
use of SPS measures by developed countries. The paper argues that developing countries
have no option but to meet the set standards if they are to compete and benefit from lucrative
developed country markets. Meeting these standards also benefits domestic markets as locals
will now have access to safe, healthy and better quality products and jobs as well as learning
by doing.
To this end, the government has invested a lot in terms of ensuring that the Botswana beef
value chain conforms to the requirements of the discerning customer in the EU. For example,
in 1997, the EU introduced a directive making it mandatory for all beef exported to the EU to
be identifiable and traceable from farm to plate, through a computerised system.
Consequently, Botswana introduced the livestock identification and traceback system (LITS)
in 1999 to meet this requirement and maintain much needed EU market access (Marumo et
al, 2009).
While securing a niche in the EU market has been lucrative, it also has its pitfalls as lack of
conformity with SPS measures can result in an export ban which has consequences for BMC
and the livelihoods of the beef producers and their families. Once imposed, not only is
revenue lost, but there is also the danger that competitors will move in to the retail space left
vacant, and more investment will be needed to restore consumer confidence in the product,
once the ban is lifted. For example, in 2011 the Botswana government suspended beef
exports to the EU for at least six months following non-compliance with EU abattoir hygiene
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and animal traceability standards. As a result, Botswana farmers lost about 48 million Euros
due to the export suspension.
According to van Engelen and others (2013) the governance of the beef value chain refers to
the vertical linkages between players along the value chain that coordinate the activities that
bring the product from farm to plate. Such linkages include spot market transactions over
contracts to vertical integration. Consequently, governance is about the power and the
capability to exert control along the chain and at any point in the chain and how much of the
marketing margin is captured. It also encompasses the players, institutions, regulations and
rules that set the parameters which comprise the safety and quality standards under which the
players operate. Information sharing, learning by doing, financing and the creation of shared
value are a crucial component of governance.
For the Botswana beef value chain, governance must address complex relationships between
buyers, butcheries, other beef processors, sellers (cattle farmers, feedlot operators), service
providers (speculators and agents, veterinary services, abattoirs, input suppliers, banks,
extension services, support programmes) and regulatory institutions such as, the Department
of Veterinary Services (DVS), that influence all the activities needed to bring beef to the final
consumer locally and abroad (van Engelen et al., 2013). The current model, in which the
DVS, farmers and the BMC seem to operate using a “silo mentality”; focusing more on
internal objectives rather than on partnering towards a common goal, is severely limiting the
industry from achieving its full potential.
The Botswana beef value chain is largely producer driven and not retailer driven. On the one
hand, there are few commercial farmers with economic clout who want to liberalize and
intensify the beef industry and on the other, there are the traditional farmers who have
political clout but prefer the extensive communal grazing system where cattle graze freely on
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communal rangelands. Consequently, for Botswana transforming the beef value chain
through upgrading for higher end market segments is constrained compared Namibia and
South Africa. The problem with this is that Botswana continues to sell high quality organic
meat products into lower priced domestic and export markets.
For the Botswana beef value chain to be economically, socially and environmentally
successful, supply chain coordination and integrity from farm to plate is crucial. However, for
the most part this is not happening. Producers generally do not know in advance where and
when they will sell their animals. This is especially the case for the small holder farmers.
Even though beef production is driven by product specifications and suffers from volatile
quantities supplied, farmers are not using forward contracts to produce weaners or oxen. As a
result, there are no contract embedded services available to farmers (e.g. credit to buy inputs
such as dry season feed). Farmers sell when they can and when they want or need to, driven
by their personal or environmental conditions, rather than on the basis of information from
buyers. Even within the BMC, the largest player in the beef value chain, coordination
between procurement, processing, distribution and sales is severely lacking. Mechanisms for
improving vertical coordination are needed which could include auctions for the sale of cattle
which are only just now beginning to be used (van Engelen et al, 2013).
Just as there is a carefully regulated system for the extraction, buying and selling of
diamonds, Botswana needs to establish a national meat council to coordinate the beef value
chain. Funded through a levy system, such a body could take on the many tasks that would
facilitate smooth value chain operations across various stakeholders. These tasks could
include brokering partnerships, mediation in sales disputes, providing market intelligence,
promoting Botswana beef in export markets and setting product approved standards for the
industry that cover the whole value chain. At present, there is little involvement from farmer
18

cooperatives, syndicates and associations in the improvement of marketing practices and
links with the BMC.
Highly coordinated and strategically designed supply chains in which all stakeholders are
achieving their objectives and are partnering to realize a common goal are necessary if
Botswana wants to establish herself as a credible, reliable supplier of differentiated, healthy,
high-quality beef products. The value embedded in the final product including its social and
environmental attributes are a cumulative outcome of what happens from range management
to the retail shelf.
Community-Based Tourism
Botswana is well endowed with flora and fauna which make tourism a major potential
contributor to economic growth. Tourism in the country is mostly wildlife-based, and most of
the national parks are located in the northern part. These include amongst others, the Moremi
Game Reserve and the Chobe National Park. The other key parks are located in the south
western parts of the country. Interestingly, the Okavango Delta which is also located in the
northern part of the country has just been inscribed as the 1000th site on the World Heritage
list. This enhances its attractiveness to tourists around the world and makes tourism in
Botswana one of the best alternatives for diversification and poverty reduction. Sadly, the
highest poverty rates in Botswana are also found in the north-western and south-western parts
of the country where the poverty rate was reported at 46% and 53% respectively (Household
Income Expenditure Survey, 2002/03).
However, the local communities adjacent to national parks are almost completely dependent
upon subsistence small-stock and crop farming for their livelihoods. This results in the humanwildlife conflict since these communities are in wildlife areas. In fact, while the nation at large
benefits from revenue brought through tourism, these communities cannot rear livestock or
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even plough at their fields freely because of the destruction caused by wild animals. Thus, they
retaliate and pose a threat to the tourism sector. Given that, the Government of Botswana
(GoB) put in efforts to devise mechanisms that could be used to compensate affected
communities and thus relieve them of poverty and vulnerability. The communities now get
involved through Community Based Tourism (CBT) which is facilitated by a programme
known as Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM). The CBT is
promoted as “means of development whereby social, environmental and economic needs of
local communities are met through offering a tourism product” (Goodwin and Santill, 2009, 4).
The evolution of CBNRM is associated with a search for new solutions for the failure of “topdown” approaches to conservation and development (Rozemeijer & Van der Jagt, 2000).
Basically, CBNRM is premised on the dual recognition that local people must have power to
make decisions relating to natural resources in order to foster sustainable development and that
they have a greater interest in the sustainable use of natural resources around them than either
more centralized or distant government or private management institutions (Mbaiwa, 2005).
CBNRM credits local populations “with having a greater understanding of, as well as vested
interest in their local environment hence they are seen as more able to effectively manage
natural resources through local or traditional practices” Mbaiwa (2004, 45).
In Botswana, CBNRM was adopted in the 1990s following the Wildlife Conservation Policy of
1986 and the national Tourism Policy of 1990 (Sebele, 2010). These policies are the pillars of
CBNRM and advocate for the involvement of rural communities in the sustainable utilization
of natural resources. They also advocate for increased opportunities for local communities to
benefit from tourism development. Under the programme, Controlled Hunting Areas (CHAs)
are established in which each area is given a wildlife off-take quota designated by the
Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP). The communities then organise
themselves and form a representative Quota Management Committee or a community Trust,
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with the assistance from DWNP to manage the whole area's quota. The committee decides how
to divide up the quota among families and has the option to enter into joint venture agreements
with commercial operators or they may opt to simply auction their hunting quota to safari
hunters or companies. The proceeds from the hunting occurring with the CHA are then used to
benefit the community.
Some community based tourism projects such as those by Chobe and Khwai trusts have done
well for communities; investing the proceeds from hunting to build schools and clinics.
However, some have failed and various scholars (Artnzen et al., 2003; Mbaiwa, 2005) have
noted limitations such as irregular benefits due to problems associated with bad relationship
between communities and operators. In addition, while the benefits could accrue to the
communities at large, households and/or individuals may not be enjoying the benefits. That is,
majority of projects do not have any defined mechanism for the equitable distribution of
benefits accruing from tourism projects. This points much to poor governance of the
programme because collective management structures are often too cumbersome and complex
to work effectively (Mitchell and Muckosy, 2008). Moreover, the imposition of democratic
and secular institutional forms on communities with traditional patterns of authority can also
have unintended effects in the sense that even though there are committees, many a times it is
traditional authorities that dictate the critical decisions especially with respect to financial
resources. The lack of transparency and poor coordination and communication between those
in Trust leadership and the rest of the general membership contributes largely to the failure of
CBT projects (Mbaiwa and Darkoh, 2006).

Some of the problems are largely associated with the short duration of contracts governing the
committee and operators which acts as a disincentive to the community members and results in
a negative attitude towards wildlife conservation (Boggs, 2005). Consequently, this
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programme has failed to reach its conservation and long-term sustainable development (SD)
goals. Ultimately, the human-wildlife conflict remains unresolved in the country, threatening
the tourism sector.
The less than favourable governance of the CBNRM programme, especially, the uneven
sharing of project benefits if not carefully managed, could become a potential impediment to
the success of community-based tourism in Botswana. Therefore, there is a need to find other
ways of re-directing these benefits to all thus promoting support for nature stewardship and
environmental education efforts as well as enhancing the quality of life of Batswana. The paper
proposes that the governance of the tourism value chain should be inclusive of all affected
communities. It should also strengthen the capacity of communities as well as create
participatory mechanisms and avenues for engaging in conventional policy processes.
It should be noted that not all parts of the country have prime national parks which are as
lucrative as those of the northwest. Nevertheless communities residing in those areas still have
to deal with human-wildlife conflicts. For instance, in the Kgalagadi area there are a lot of
lions which are a threat to livestock and residents. Such areas do not receive high numbers of
tourists as those in the northern part of the country. This translates to tourism revenue
generation and benefits being skewed towards the north-western part of the country. In this
way, the CBNRM policy which allows communities around national parks to benefit from
revenues generated from a natural resource where they reside contradicts the mines and
mineral policy, which allows all Batswana to benefit from mineral revenues regardless of
where they reside. The paper therefore proposes a benefit sharing mechanism. That is, an
environmental fund could be established whereby the different CBNRM trusts contribute
proportionately towards the fund. The proceeds so raised will be shared equally amongst the
affected communities residing around national parks.
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Conclusion
Botswana’s success is largely anchored on its governance and in turn, usage of natural
resources. First, the paper shows how governance of land and natural resources (nonrenewable resources) assisted it to evade the resource curse; at least so far, – suggesting that
indeed governance makes a difference to a country’s development prospects. The country
identified land and minerals as strategic resources whose ownership and control was critical to
the country’s development. It is the prudent usage of these resources that has helped to
transform the country from a low to a middle income status. This is commendable by African
standards considering its level of poverty at independence in 1966. Despite the success in the
non-renewable sector contradictions remain as noted in the paper. To this extent the nonrenewable sector offers lessons to the renewable sectors. Secondly, it has shown how the
country can use renewable resources (agriculture and tourism) to realise sustainable
development. As demonstrated with the mineral sector, we contend that governance is equally
critical for renewable resources to realise their full potential. To this extent, other African
countries need to consider and review their governance structures in order to realise sustainable
development. The paper concludes as follows, with respect to renewable resources in
Botswana: with regard to agriculture it proposes the establishment of a national meat council
to oversee the governance of the beef value chain. It also proposes the establishment of a
benefit sharing mechanism in the tourism sector. That is, an environmental fund from which
the different CBNRM trusts could contribute proportiately towards. This would allow the
proceeds from the fund to be shared equally by those residing around national parks. While
this appears contradictory to what is happening in the mineral sector, we are proposing that
communities that reside alongside national parks benefit from the environmental fund because
they are the ones dealing with the day to day vagaries of human-wildlife conflict unlike those
residing elsewhere.
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